I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1988 , the United States Supreme Court vacated the death sentence of William Wayne Thompson, a fifteen year old Oklahoman found guilty of first degree murder.' The case was decided under the auspices of the eighth amendment's prohibition against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment." ' 2 By examining the treatment of chronological age in state and federal capital punishment statutes, the behavior of juries, and the disproportionality between the death penalty and ajuvenile's culpability, a plurality of the Court determined that the execution of a person less than sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of a capital offense 3 is unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, rejected the plurality's bright line rule but nevertheless vacated Thompson's death penalty due to the Oklahoma legislature's apparent lack of careful deliberati6n in permitting a juvenile to be transferred from juvenile court to criminal court where he would thereby be subjected to the state's capital punishment statute.
After challenging the import of the Court's survey of legislation and jury behavior, this Note proposes that the great strength of the Court's opinion lies in its affirmance of the fundamental precepts and objects of the juvenile justice system, a system that has until recently suffered the harsh criticism of a skeptical Court.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours ofJanuary 23, 1983, fifteen year old 1 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 Ct. (1988 . 2 The eighth amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3 A capital offense is a crime for which one of the possible punishments is death.
thermore, the district court determined that "no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation" existed for Thompson, and therefore ordered that he stand trial as an adult. 13 Thompson appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which subsequently affirmed certification.
14 A jury found Thompson guilty of first degree murder on December 9, 1983.15 The same jury determined at the penalty phase of the trial that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, but could not conclude that the defendant was likely to commit further criminal acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society. 16 The jury thereby fixed Thompson's punishment at death. 17 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Thompson's conviction and sentence on August 29, 1986,18 stating that "'once a minor is certified to stand trial as an adult, he may also, without in the head with the boots and, moreover, that he had cut Keene's throat and chest and shot him in the head. Finally, after a witness claimed to have seen Keene dancing at a local bar, Thompson remarked that that would be hard to do since Keene had a bullet in his head. Id. at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 2690 (emphasis in original). In determining whether prospects for reasonable rehabilitation exist, the court must consider the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community, and whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; 2. Whether the offense was against persons or property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted; 3. The sophistication and maturity of thejuvenile and his capability of distinguishing right from wrong as determined by consideration of his psychological evaluation, home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living; 4. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with community agencies, law enforcement agencies, schools, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation or prior commitments to juvenile institutions; 5. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile if he is found to have committed the alleged offense, by the use of procedures and facilities currently available to the juvenile court; and 6. Whether the offense occurred while the juvenile was escaping or in an escape status from an institution for delinquent children. OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 10, § 1112 10, § (West 1987 .
14 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2713 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 15 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in pertinent part: "A. A person commits murder in the first degree when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought causes the death of another human being. Malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof." OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7 (West 1982) . 16 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690. 17 Id. The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in pertinent part: "A. A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to murder in the first degree shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole or by imprisonment for life." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.9 (West 1988)(amended in 1987 to include the "imprisonment for life without parole" penalty option).
18 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690. violating the Constitution, be punished as an adult. '"19 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 20 to consider whether a death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments for a crime committed by a fifteen year old child, 2 ' as well as whether certain photographic evidence, deemed erroneously admitted at the guilt phase, violates a capital defendant's constitutional rights if considered at the penalty phase. 22 
III. THE PLURALITY-EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma. 23 Justice Stevens first noted that the Framers of the Constitution failed to clearly define the contours of the eighth amendment's prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, 24 and that as a result judges must continually examine the "'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' "25 The Court has traditionally considered state legislation 26 and jury determinations, in addition to its own judgment, 2 7 as representative of society's evolving standards of decency.
8
A.
STATE LEGISLATION
The plurality initially noted that state legislatures, including Oklahoma's, recognize a basic distinction between children and 
1986)).
20 479 U. S. 1084 (1987) .
21 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691. 22 Id. Neither the plurality nor the concurrence attempted to resolve the second question presented "given the Court's disposition of the principal issue." Id. at 2700 n.48. Moreover, the dissent stated, "we have never before held that the excessively inflammatory character of concededly relevant evidence can form the basis for a constitutional attack, and I would decline to do so in this case." Id. at 2722 (Scalia, J., dissenting). S. 782, 789-93 (1982) ).
27 Id. at 2692 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977 ).
28 Id. at 2691 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976 ; Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-796).
The plurality explained that reliance upon evolving standards of decency is necessitated by the eighth amendment's use of the term "unusual." The term means frequency of occurrence or magnitude of acceptance. Thus, determining what constitutes "unusual" entails reference to society's evolving standards. Id. at 2692 n.7. adults. 2 9 In searching for a bright line between childhood and adulthood, the plurality noted that "the normal [fifteen year old] is not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult." 3 0 To substantiate its assertion, the Court observed that none of the state jurisdictions 3 1 allows a fifteen year old to vote 32 or serve on ajury.
3 3
Furthermore, all but one of the states prohibit a fifteen year old from driving without parental consent, 3 4 all but four prohibit a fifteen year old from marrying without parental consent, 3 5 all but one prohibit a fifteen year old from purchasing pornographic materials, 3 6 and most of those states permitting legalized gambling prohibit minors from participating in this activity without parental consent. 3 7 Additionally, the Court placed great emphasis upon the fact that the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction in each state does not exceed sixteen. The plurality then focused on the status of the death penalty in each state, particularly with regard to juvenile offenders. 3 9 The Court noted that most state legislatures have not deliberated over the establishment of a minimum age for capital punishment. 40 The reason behind this inactivity may be found in the fact that fourteen states do not authorize the death penalty, 4 1 and nineteen other 15, § 13 (West 1983). Oklahoma does not allow minors to vote, sit on a jury, marry without parental consent, purchase alcohol or cigarettes, patronize bingo parlors unaccompanied by an adult, consent to health care services unless emancipated, or operate or work at a shooting gallery. Additionally, minors are generally not held criminally responsible (except when certified to stand trial as an adult as Thompson was), and minors may disaffirm contracts except for "necessaries" (such as indispensible transportation to and from work). Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2692, 2692 n.14.
30 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2693. Furthermore, the plurality stated:
The very assumptions we make about our children when we legislate on their behalf tells us that it is likely cruel, and certainly unusual, to impose on a child a punishment that takes as its predicate the existence of a fully rational, choosing agent, who may be deterred by the harshest of sanctions and toward whom society may legitimately take a retributive stance. states do not specify a minimum age for the operation of their death penalty statutes. 4 2 As a result, the Court decided to put these thirtythree statutes to one side "because they do not focus on the question of where the chronological age line should be drawn." ' 43 Instead, the plurality narrowed its focus to the eighteen states that require a criminal defendant to have attained at least a minimum age of sixteen years at the time of the commission of the crime before the death penalty may be imposed.
4
Finally, the plurality cited as authority the views of certain professional organizations and the international community. 4 43 Id. at 2695. The plurality maintained, though, that a general comparison of the states whose death penalty statutes would or would not permit the execution of a fifteen year old would yield a two to one result in favor of disallowing capital punishment. To arrive at this ratio, the Court added the fourteen states with no death penalty at all to the eighteen states that have a minimum age of no less than sixteen years in their death penalty statutes, along with South Dakota and Vermont, two states that have not imposed the death penalty since 1972. The total of thirty-four is twice the total number of states that can theoretically impose the death penalty on a fifteen year old. Id. at 2695 n.29.
In 1972, a majority of the Court held in five separate concurring opinions that certain state death penalty provisions as written constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment because the provisions often led to the imposition of infrequent and haphazard death sentences. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972 A complete discussion of the relevance of the international community's standards as applied to the execution of juvenile offenders is provided by several amici curiae briefs submitted to the Court. Brief for Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law Group, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988 ; Brief for Amicus Curiae Defense for Children International-USA, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 Ct. (1988 ; Brief for Amicus Curiae Amnesty International in Support of Petitioner, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 Ct. (1988 age eighteen at the time of the offense. 46 In addition, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, West Germany, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, the Scandanavian countries, Canada, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the Soviet Union all prohibit the death penalty for juveniles. 47 The Court also noted that three human rights treaties, two signed but not ratified by the United States and one ratified by the United States, explicitly prohibit the death penalty for juveniles under certain circumstances. 48 To complement its survey of legislation and professional and international opinion, the Court next examined the behavior of juries.
B. JURY DETERMINATIONS
To determine the public's acceptance of the death penalty for juveniles, the plurality reviewed the frequency with which American juries have imposed the death penalty on a criminal defendant under sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. 4 9 The Court cited its earlier decision in Furman v. Georgia for the proposition that infrequent and haphazard death penalty sentences are unconstitutional. 50 The data, the Court maintained, supported such a conclusion in Thompson in that only between eighteen and twenty persons have been executed in the twentieth century for crimes committed while under age sixteen, 5 1 with Louisiana executing the last in 1948.52 From this data, the Court concluded that "[t]he road we have traveled during the past four decades-in which thousands ofjuries have tried murder cases-leads to the unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a [fifteen year old] offender is now generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community." 5 3
To further support its conclusion, the plurality reviewed United 190-208 (1987) In the last phase of its analysis, the plurality questioned whether it is appropriate to measure a juvenile's culpability by adult standards. 5 7 The Court stated that " 'punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.' "58 Furthermore, Justice Stevens maintained that ultimately the Supreme Court should determine the proper interpretation of the "sweeping clauses" of the Constitution, 59 including the "cruel and unusual" clause of the eighth amendment. To underscore the mitigating force a young capital defendant's age should wield, 61 the Court noted that "adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults." 6 2 Consequently, less culpability should attach to a juvenile offender than to an adult offender even when both are guilty of comparable crimes. 63 115-16 (1982) ).
63 Id. The Court relied extensively on the following passage from Eddings: "Adolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, the Court argued that the juvenile justice system embodies the principle that a child " 'has no criminal responsibility.' "64 Citing extensive scholarship on the subject, the plurality concluded that special considerations, such as ajuvenile's intelligence, background, education and experience, should result in less severe penalties for juvenile offenders than those imposed upon adults.
65
The plurality reviewed, as applied to juveniles convicted of a capital crime, the dual purpose of capital punishment: retribution and deterrence. 66 With regard to retribution, 67 the Court held that its premise is inapplicable to the execution of a juvenile offender "[g]iven the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its children." 6 8 As for deterrence, the Court first noted that it is questionable whether capital punishment actually deters criminals of any age. 69 Furthermore, before committing a capital crime a juvenile will unlikely make a cost-benefit analysis that might attach weight to more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility for the development of America's youth." Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 n.1 1 (quoting TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SEN-TENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978)). Ct. 2687 Ct. (1988 .
66 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2699. 67 Retribution, according to the Court, denotes "'an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. '" Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion)).
68 Id. The Court emphasized that it has in the past invalidated death sentences which lack the retributive effect. Id. at 2699 n. 44 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) the possibility of execution. 70 Nor will a juvenile likely be deterred by the knowledge that only a handful of juvenile offenders have been executed in this century. 7 1 Absent retribution and deterrence, capital punishment for juvenile offenders is "'nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering. '-72 Thus, the Court determined that the existence of a national consensus, as evidenced by legislation, jury determinations, and other factors, as well as the disproportionality of the death penalty as a reaction to a juvenile offender's culpability, result in a constitutional prohibition against the execution of persons less than sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of a capital offense.
IV. THE CONCURRENCE

A. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY-NO NATIONAL
CONSENSUS, YET
Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality's contention that a certain age exists below which a child should not receive the death penalty, and that the Court must determine this age "in light of the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' 74 However, Justice O'Connor would require more evidence before adopting the plurality's demarcation of this age at sixteen. Justice O'Connor first reviewed the relevant state legislation concerning capital punishment. 76 She maintained that the evidence weighs heavily against the death penalty for juveniles because "no legislature in this country has affirmatively and unequivocally endorsed" capital punishment for fifteen year olds, 7 7 and because those states that have banned capital punishment for juveniles have done so "unambiguously. '7 8 Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor conceded that nineteen states, as well as the federal government, theoretically permit juvenile executions as a result of the interaction between adult certification procedures and capital punishment pro- 
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visions. 7 9 As a result, Justice O'Connor concluded that more state legislatures will have to specifically address the issue before a national consensus can be ascertained. 8 0 Justice O'Connor explained that a state legislature might unwittingly apply a capital punishment provision to juvenile offenders. 8 1 For example, state legislatures might provide for adult certification of juveniles for reasons other than the possibility of subjecting the juvenile to capital punishment. 8 2 In fact, Justice O'Connor speculated that those states that have lowered their minimum adult certification age in recent years have probably done so only to make available long confinement or maximum security facilities for serious juvenile offenders, rather than to make available the death penalty as a potential penalty for such offenders. 7579-80 (1988) ).
are not dispositive." 8 9 Finding fault with a blind application of raw statistical data, Justice O'Connor postulated that such data do not reveal, for example, how many juries considered the death penalty for juvenile offenders or how many prosecutors refrained from seeking the death penalty for juvenile offenders. 90 Finally, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality's disproportionality derivation. 9 ' Justice O'Connor argued that, though greater culpability generally attaches to adults than to juveniles with regard to similar crimes, "it does not necessarily follow that all [fifteen year olds] are incapable of the moral culpability that would justify the imposition of capital punishment." 9 2 Moreover, Justice O'Connor claimed that, absent proof to the contrary, capital punishment might deter juvenile offenders as a class. 93 After citing a number of cases in which the Court permitted age-based treatment in state legislation, Justice O'Connor reasoned that state legislatures, rather than a "subjective" Court, can more appropriately gauge a particular legislative provision's application to various age groups and to the widely varying characteristics among persons of the same chronological age.
94
In concluding its criticism of the plurality's reasoning, the concurrence warned of the danger of relying on rote statistics to ascertain societal consensus. 9 5 To substantiate this claim, Justice O'Connor observed that an apparent trend toward abolition of the death penalty, which began in 1846 and continued through the 1960s, unexpectedly reversed following the Court's Furman 9 6 decision in 1972.
9 7 As Justice O'Connor stated, "any inference of a so-cietal consensus rejecting the death penalty would have been mistaken [in Furman] ." 9 8 Furthermore, "the mistaken premise of the decision would have been frozen into constitutional law, making it difficult to refute and even more difficult to reject." 9 9
B. MINIMUM AGE REQUIREMENT IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATUTES
In agreeing to vacate Thompson's death sentence despite the plurality's reasoning, Justice O'Connor focused upon the Court's traditional treatment of capital punishment. 10 0 Justice O'Connor observed that the Court consistently requires "special care and deliberation" in proceedings that might lead to the imposition of capital punishment. 1 0 ' Accordingly, Justice O'Connor continued, substantive and procedural restrictions must attend each decision to impose the death penalty, thereby insuring "the serious and calm reflection that ought to precede any decision of such gravity and finality." 0 2
Justice O'Connor determined that the State of Oklahoma failed to meet the Court's standard of careful consideration and deliberate review in sentencing Thompson to death for the murder of his brother-in-law.' 0 3 The concurrence noted that the Oklahoma legislature enacted both a death penalty statute and an adult certification provision that together rendered fifteen year olds death eligible "without the earmarks of careful consideration that [the Court has] ished capital punishment for all crimes but treason, beginning a trend that would continue for over a century. By 1968, "executions ceased completely for several years." Id. required for other kinds of decisions leading to the death penalty."' 0 4 Justice O'Connor concluded that persons under sixteen years of age may not be executed "under the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution." 10 5 The Oklahoma state legislature and the eighteen state legislatures with similar provisions 1 0 6 should therefore determine "the ultimate moral issue at stake" in the first instance by specifying a minimum age for capital punishment. 107
V. THE DISSENT A. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY-NO NATIONAL CONSENSUS
The issue in Thompson, as framed byJustice Scalia in his dissenting opinion, 1 0 8 was whether there existed a national consensus that "no criminal so much as one day under [sixteen], after individuated consideration of his circumstances, including the overcoming of a presumption that he should not be tried as an adult, can possibly be deemed mature and responsible enough to be punished with death for any crime."' 1 0 9 The dissent could find "no plausible basis" for answering the question in the affirmative. 1 " 0
To underscore its message, the dissent detailed the facts and procedural history that led to the imposition of the death sentence for Thompson. "'1 The dissent hoped to show that Thompson was not "a juvenile caught up in a legislative scheme that unthinkingly lumped him together with adults." 1 12 Justice Scalia argued, to the contrary, that Thompson qualified for both adult certification and the death penalty as determined, respectively, by a court that considered whether he should be subjected to the criminal justice system at all and a jury that considered whether, despite his age and maturity, he should be subjected to the state's most severe punish- states with capital punishment provisions, including Oklahoma, provide that juvenile offenders can theoretically receive a death sentence for certain crimes.' 20 With the federal government and nearly forty percent of state governments supporting its position, the dissent questioned the plurality's reliance on capital punishment legislation as dispositive of the existence of a national consensus.' 2 1 Second, Justice Scalia found fault with the plurality's examination of jury behavior, an examination which the dissent claimed resulted merely in an inexact statistical exercise.' 2 2 Responding to the plurality's observations that no juvenile under sixteen years of age has been executed for forty years and that juveniles have only rarely received the death penalty in recent years,' 23 the dissent stated, "we are not discussing whether the Constitution requires such procedures as will continue to cause [the death penalty for juveniles] to be rare, but whether the Constitution prohibits [the death penalty for juveniles] entirely."' 12 4 Rather than attribute the rarity of juvenile executions to a marked societal consensus, the dissent suggested that several factors have combined to reduce the number of executions for persons of all ages. These factors include the exercise of executive clemency, 12 5 a general reduction in public support for capital punishment, 126 and a trend toward individualized sentencing determinations. 2 7 "In sum, the statistics of executions demonstrate nothing except the fact that our society has always agreed that executions of [fifteen year old] criminals should be rare, and in more modern times has agreed that they (like all other executions) should Supra note 48 and accompanying text. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2715-16 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 120 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent has merely compared the nineteen states that have no minimum age for capital punishment, see supra note 42, to the eighteen states that have specified a minimum age, see supra note 44. 121 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized the plurality's reliance on the status of capital punishment in other nations, stating that "where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution." Id. at 2716-17 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 2716-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting be even rarer still."128 Third, Justice Scalia disagreed with* the plurality's implicit assertion that the individual members of the Court sit as the ultimate arbiters of eighth amendment interpretation.
1 29 The dissent maintained that the Court should examine the original understanding of "cruel and unusual" as well as consider society's current understanding of "cruel and unusual," rather than focus on the Justices' personal understandings of "cruel and unusual."' 3 0 Accordingly, Justice Scalia reiterated the dissent's position that the original understanding of "cruel and unusual" did not include the imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile offender, nor does society's current understanding compel a contrary conclusion. 3 1 B.
REACTION TO THE CONCURRENCE Justice Scalia disputed Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the Oklahoma legislature must explicitly determine whether a person under sixteen years of age can receive the death penalty. 13 2 The dissent stated that the concurrence failed to limit its decision to the constitutional question presented after doubting the absence of a national consensus.' 3 3 As stated by Justice Scalia, "I do not see how Moreover, the dissent reiterated that Thompson's death sentence 128 Id. at 2718 (Scalia,J., dissenting). Justice Scalia warned that the plurality's individualized consideration might lead, for example, to an inference that the infrequent execution of women, seventeen year olds, and eighteen year olds in the past several decades should warrant a similar constitutional ban against the imposition of the death penalty.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia further criticized the plurality's reliance on state and federal laws that limit a juvenile's rights, such as, the right to vote. According to Justice Scalia, the Court's cases "suggest that constitutional rules relating to the maturity of minors must be drawn with an eye to the decision for which the maturity is relevant." Id. at 2718 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725-27 (1979)).
129 Id. at 2718-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 130 Id. at 2719 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 131 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia relied on the following passage to illustrate the view opposite to that of the plurality: "'Minors who become embroiled with the law range from the very young up to those on the brink of majority. Some of the older minors become fully 'street-wise,' hardened criminals, deserving no greater consideration than that properly accorded all persons suspected of crime.'" Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 734 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
132 Id. at 2720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
was not "a fluke," and that even if it was, the Governor of Oklahoma could use his pardon power to lift the sentence should Oklahoma citizens so demand. 13 5 Finally, the dissent criticized both the concurrence's usurpation of the legislature's right to specify the form state legislation shall take,1 3 6 and the concurrence's subversion of the principle that only a valid, rather than a hypothetical, existence of a national consensus justifies judicially imposed constitutional restraints.t 3 7 "The concurrence's approach is a solomonic solution to the problem of how to prevent execution in the present case while at the same time not holding that the execution of those under 
VI. ANALYSIS
Thompson does not simply involve a plebeian capital punishment issue that demands an examination of the nation's pulse. The case also raises some questions about the juvenile justice system's interaction with the adult criminal justice system. The Court has spent approximately the last twenty years granting juvenile offenders like Thompson the due process rights and privileges that adult offenders enjoy. During that same twenty year period of time, the Court has refined and limited death penalty statutes to include the very class of criminals to which Thompson belongs. As a result, the Court pushed itself into a corner with regard to juvenile executions by making it possible for a state like Oklahoma to constitutionally provide for the execution of convicted juvenile murderers who have been certified to stand trial as adults. The Court's choice in Thomp-135 Id. at 2720-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in pertinent part that "no judge, court or officer, other than the Governor, can reprieve or suspend the execution of the judgment of death .... OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1004 (West 1986 . The warden of the state prison, as an exception to the Governor's power, can suspend execution in the case of a prisoner who has gone insane or in the case of a prisoner who has become pregnant. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § § 1005-1013 (West 1986).
136 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2721 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia claimed that the concurrence's proposal will make it difficult to pass capital punishment legislation for juveniles, just as it would be difficult to pass capital punishment legislation for "blind people," "white-haired grandmothers," and "mothers of two-year-olds." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the concurrence "hoists on the deck of our [e]ighth [a]mendment jurisprudence the loose cannon of a brand new principle," which requires explicit mention of fifteen year olds in capital punishment statutes. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia asked whether this means that any appealing group deserves mention, such as "those of extremely low intelligence" or "those over 75." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
son was quite clear, either: 1) continue to equate the juvenile justice system to the adult criminal justice system and thereby support the death penalty for fifteen year old convicted murderers; or 2) recognize that executions do not completely belong in the adult/juvenile equation. Capital punishment and the juvenile justice system clashed in Thompson, and youth emerged the victor.
To resolve the complex issues in Thompson, 'the Court determined that the eighth amendment question concerning cruel and unusual punishment was the most compelling. Although the eighth amendment issue is arguably the Court's most important concern, the case unfortunately illustrates that the search for a national consensus to determine "the evolving standards of decency" can delude even the most objective querist. Notwithstanding the absence of a clear national consensus, the Thompson plurality insisted that recourse to a bright line rule satisfied the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Considering the alternative analyses the Court could have employed in reaching this decision, its "Gallup poll" type survey of state law and jury statistics seems especially dubious.
Upon discovering that no national consensus had clearly evolved concerning the death penalty-for juveniles, the Court should have examined whether Oklahoma's laws afforded Thompson the constitutional protections, both in the adult certification proceeding and in the sentencing proceeding, that the Court has mandated during its past three decades of jurisprudence. If Oklahoma's legal system failed to adequately protect Thompson's rights, the Court could have reversed or vacated the lower court's decision. 13 9 Had the Court discovered that Oklahoma courts had indeed instituted constitutionally sound proceedings which nevertheless resulted in the imposition of the death penalty, the Court should have then examined in greater detail the extent to which juvenile executions deviate from traditional juvenile justice theory.
The plurality failed to recognize that the Supreme Court has only rarely attempted to base so much of its decision upon a determination of the "evolving standards of decency." Justices Brennan and Marshall accepted the petitioner's proposition in Furman that society no longer tolerated capital punishment for just any crime, but the Justices' separate analyses attached great weight to several factors. 140 Justice Brennan considered that a severe punishment must not be degrading to the dignity of human beings, arbitrarily inflicted, excessive, or unacceptable to contemporary society.1 4 1
Similarly, Justice Marshall determined that a punishment must not be intolerably painful and sufferable, unusual, excessive, or offensive to society's contemporary values.
1 4 2
The Court subsequently treated contemporary standards as but one factor in determining the constitutionality of a particular punishment. In Gregg v. Georgia, Justice Stewart stated, "the [e]ighth [a]mendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society." 1 43 In Woodson v. North Carolina, Justice Stewart considered the contemporary standards, as manifested by history and tradition, legislative enactments, and jury determinations, in addition to jury discretion and individualized consideration, to determine whether mandatory death sentence provisions were unconstitutional.
14 4 In Coker v. Georgia, Justice White observed that a national consensus against capital punishment for rape very clearly existed because at that time only three states authorized the death penalty for the crime of rape and juries only 140 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257, 314 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring and Marshall, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 270-282 (Brennan, J., concurring). To support the principle that a severe punishment must be acceptable to contemporary society, Justice Brennan stated that "It]he progressive decline in, and the current rarity of, the infliction of death demonstrate that our society seriously questions the appropriateness of this punishment today." Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, unlike the Thompson plurality, did not infer that a national consensus thereby existed. Id. at 296-300 (Brennan, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 329-333 (Marshall, J., concurring). After examining the historical application of capital punishment, Justice Marshall concluded that "the death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violates the [e]ighth [a]mendment." Id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall further held that capital punishment violates the eighth amendment "because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history." Justice Marshall did not base this decision on the existence of a national consensus, but on factors such as the superiority of life imprisonment to death as a form of punishment and the discriminatory nature of capital punishment. Id. at 362-64 (Marshall, J., concurring). The Court's attempt in Thompson to reduce its decision to a national consensus formula is certainly not supported by earlier decisions regarding the death penalty, as Justice Marshall's Furman opinion illustrates.
143 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976)(Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stewart then examined the purposes of capital punishment, retribution and deterrence, as well as the disproportionality of the punishment to the crime. Id. at 183-87 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
144 428 U.S. 280, 288-305 (1976)(Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stewart did not rest his entire opinion on the existence of a national consensus because, at that time, ten states had enacted mandatory death penalty provisions. Id. at 313 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
rarely.imposed the death sentence upon a convicted rapist. 1 45 Even given such clear societal evidence, Justice White further examined the disproportionality of the death penalty as a response to the crime of rape. 14 6 Only recently has the Court relied exclusively on the "evolving standards of decency" test in deciding the constitutionality of a death penalty provision absent a clear national consensus. In Enmund v. Florida, Justice White held that imposition of the death penalty where a defendant is involved in a robbery in the course of which a murder is committed by a co-felon was barred by the contemporary standards of decency because only eight states authorized capital punishment in such circumstances and because juries overwhelmingly and consistently rejected capital punishment in such casesJ 4 7 According to the Enmund dissent, however, twentythree states at that time permitted the imposition of the death penalty where the defendant neither intended to kill nor actually killed the victims.14 8 Like the instant case, the decision in Enmund became a battle of the interpretation of legislation and statistics, neither side of which could easily claim victory.
In Thompson, the plurality and the dissent each distorted the relevance of existing state and federal legislation. The Thompson plurality argued that, practically speaking, the number of states that prohibit the execution of a fifteen year old offender total thirty-four, while only seventeen states theoretically allow such executions, thus resulting in a 2:1 ratio.' 49 The Thompson dissent claimed that nearly forty percent of the states as well as the federal government permit juvenile executions.' 50 It is difficult to believe that both opinions 145 433 U.S. 584, 595-97 (1977)(White, J., plurality opinion). 146 Id. at 597-99 (White, J., plurality opinion). 147 458 U. S. 782, 789-96 (1982) (White, J., plurality opinion). According to the Court, the death penalty could only be imposed on a participant in a felony murder if the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Id. at 801. Since Enmund, the Court has held that a showing of reckless indifference to human life is sufficient to satisfy the culpability requirement for capital punishment as applied to a major participant in a felony murder. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S. 137 (1987) . Therefore, the Tison decision somewhat redeems the Enmund Court's misplaced emphasis on a nonexistent national consensus by recognizing that many states permit the execution of major participants in felony murders even absent a showing of specific intent.
148 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Both the plurality and the dissent agreed that the sentencing hearing failed to consider as a mitigating circumstance the defendant's minor role in the felony murders. Id. at 798-800 (White, J., plurality opinion); id. at 830 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text for the plurality's discussion of state legislation.
150 See supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text for the dissent's discussion of state legislation.
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were talking about the same legislation. Justice O'Connor, recognizing the Court's impasse, acknowledged that the evidence weighs heavily against juvenile executions, but concluded that this alone is not indicative of a national consensus.1 5 1 As further evidence of the distortions created by this national survey, not one Justice recognized that the states that still permit juvenile executions are generally concentrated in two large regions of the country, the South and the West. 15 2 The plurality's claim that a "national" consensus exists is therefore untenable.
Furthermore, the plurality and the dissent contorted jury statistics in Thompson as if magnifying a nearly horizontal curve such that it appears to be vertical. The plurality cited the rare imposition of the death penalty for persons under sixteen years of age at the time of the crime. 153 The dissent rebuked this argument by stating that juvenile executions should be rare; moreover, the dissent pointed to the rare, yet constitutional, execution of women. 154 Justice O'Connor again recognized the folly in trying to second guess jury determinations through an examination of statistics, especially given the cyclical and often unpredictable nature of society's position on capital punishment. 1 55 Had the Court considered its historical use of contemporary standards as but one factor in determining the constitutionality of a particular death penalty provision, it would have recognized, as did Justice O'Connor, that legislation and jury determinations merely lend support to the plurality's conclusion and are not dispositive of the eighth amendment question confronting the Court.
Given the divided Court and the nonparticipation of newly appointed Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor's concurrence might provide the actual holding in Thompson. 5 6 The concurring opinion does not escape criticism, however. A careful examination of the proceedings that culminated in the imposition of the death penalty as punishment for Thompson's crime disproves Justice O'Connor's argument that Oklahoma's legislature and courts failed to meet the Court's traditional standard of careful deliberation and review. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's opinion legislates more than it adjudicates. Indeed, the concurring opinion serves as a case study of the impropriety of such judicial activism.
The Court has continuously instituted procedural safeguards to protect a criminal defendant from the imposition of an arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate punishment. More specifically, the Court has on occasion addressed the disposition ofjuvenile offenders. In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized the juvenile court's right to certify a juvenile offender to stand trial as an adult and thereby transfer the offender to criminal court jurisdiction. 15 8 To satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process and fair treatment, the Court decreed that a juvenile facing adult certification is entitled to a hearing, representation by counsel, access to records and reports considered by the juvenile court, and a statement of reasons for the juvenile court's ultimate decision. 15 9 The Court in Kent recognized that the decision to transfer a juvenile to the jurisdiction of the adult criminal courts "was potentially as important to petitioner as the difference between five years' confinement and a death sentence."' 160 The Court recommended a list of factors that ajuvenile court should consider before certifying ajuvenile offender to stand trial as an adult, 6 1 factors which Oklahoma's statute largely incorporates.1 6 2
In compliance with Kent, the Oklahoma district court certified Thompson to stand trial as an adult. 1 6 3 After two separate hearings in which it received fourteen exhibits and the testimony of fourteen witnesses into evidence, the district court considered whether the prospect of reasonable rehabilitation existed for Thompson and ultimately answered the question in the negative.1 64 The court found substantial evidence that: 1) the wounds and injuries to the body, concealment of the victim's body, and instrumentalities used to effectuate death all demonstrated the serious, aggressive, violent, premeditated and willful nature of the crime; 2) the offense was intentionally committed against a person; 3) Thompson did not suffer from any mental illness or immaturity, and understood the difference between right and wrong at the time of the crime's commission; 4) Thompson had a long and very antisocial history of previous contacts with law enforcement; 5) neither counseling nor institutionalization had had positive effects on Thompson, and the prospects for rehabilitation were low; and 6) Thompson was not at the time of the crime's commission escaping from an institution for delinquent children. 16 5 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently affirmed Thompson's certification to stand trial as an adult. 166 The Court has gone beyond adult certification proceedings to protect juvenile offenders and others from the death penalty. The Court in Gregg instituted a bifurcated proceeding 16 7 to ensure that the sentencing authority receives adequate information and guidance and thereby avoids the imposition of arbitrary and capricious sentences. 168 Furthermore, the Court has on several occasions ad- T. v. Oklahoma, No. J-83-362 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) . 167 A bifurcated proceeding is one in which the guilt phase and the sentencing phase of the trial are two separate proceedings which often involve the same judge and jury. dressed the issue of individualized consideration in the sentencing procedure. In Woodson, the Court held that in order to "guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death," the sentencing authority must consider objective standards as well as the character and record of the offender and the circumstances of the offense before imposing its sentence. 169 In Lockett v. Ohio, the Court stated that "[t]o meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors."' 70 Perhaps most importantly in the context of Thompso'n, the Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma held that no limitations should be placed on the mitigating circumstances considered by the sentencing authority.' 7 1 Moreover, relevant mitigating circumstances often include the age as well as the mental and emotional development of the offender.' 72 Thompson's sentencing procedures satisfied the Court's requirements as outlined above. First, Thompson's trial involved a bifurcated proceeding as mandated by Oklahoma law in which the jury first considered the guilt of the defendant and then, in a separate proceeding, considered the appropriate punishment. 173 Second, Oklahoma law provided that the sentencing authority consider several objective standards as possible aggravating circumstances potentially leading to the imposition of a death sentence t74 Third, Oklahoma law did not preclude the consideration of any mitigating When a human life is at stake and when the jury must have information prejudicial to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of penalty in order to impose a rational sentence, a bifurcated system is more likely to ensure elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman. Id. at 191-92 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
169 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist disagreed, stating that "for a court to attempt to catalogue the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever be really complete." Id. at 320-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
170 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (December 9, 1983) .
177 The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in part:
In the sentencing proceeding, the statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be given in the charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict be a unanimous recommendation of death, shall designate in writing ... the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt.... Unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act is so found or if it is found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall not be imposed.... OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1988) .
178 Indeed, the Court has previously stated, " 'jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due regard for the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety of factors, many of which will have been suggested by the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel.'" Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 320 (1976)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971) ). the death penalty."' 81 If the Oklahoma legislature had not anticipated such a result, it would certainly have revised the capital punishment statute in the years between Eddings' death sentence and Thompson's death sentence. As further proof of the Oklahoma legislature's intention to resist any revision of its capital punishment statute, another sixteen year old was sentenced to death in 1986, two years after Thompson received his death sentence.1 8 2 Given the widespread publicity of Thompson's trial and its broad public exposure, 18 3 the legislature would have modified its capital punishment statute had the citizens of Oklahoma so demanded. In short, the Oklahoma legislature has been on notice for nearly ten years that its capital punishment statute and adult certification procedures can lead to the execution of a juvenile offender.
Thus, Justice O'Connor's assumption that Oklahoma failed to deliberate is simply unfounded. By the time Thompson would have received a lethal drug injection, the following Oklahoma entities would have considered the judgment: legislators, the Governor, prosecuting attorneys, the juvenile court, the district court, the appellate courts, the jury, and of course, the public. More importantly, Oklahoma followed the Supreme Court's own guidelines and decisions in creating and defining both its death penalty statute and its adult certification proceedings. As the dissent stated, Thompson's death sentence was not "a fluke."' 1 4 Rather, one can argue that the Court had, through its prior decisions, placed its stamp of approval on the execution of William Wayne Thompson and others like him.
Because the Court's analysis can be easily refuted, the Court must have misplaced its emphasis. First, there is no clear national consensus. Second, the laws and procedures in Oklahoma are constitutionally sound. Yet, Thompson's death sentence was vacated. The Court is clearly sending a jurisprudential message that pertains to neither a popular opinion poll nor judicial activism. Rather, the relevance of Thompson is buried in the plurality's analysis of the disproportionality of the death sentence as a response to a juvenile offender's culpability. 18 See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text for the plurality's discussion of the disproportionality of the death penalty as a response to a juvenile's culpability.. plurality's argument "irrelevant,"' ' 8 6 while the concurrence maintained that some fifteen year olds harbor the kind of moral culpability that justifies the imposition of a death sentence. 8 7 Unfortunately, the real issue at stake escaped extensive consideration in all three opinions.
Thompson's death sentence challenged whether the juvenile justice system or the adult criminal justice system serves as the most appropriate forum for streetwise, hardened, repeat juvenile offenders. Because adult certification proceedings are capable of making that determination, the question confronting the Court was whether the adult criminal justice system may sentence a child to die.
For a period in this country's history, a young offender was treated no differently than an adult; a murderer was a murderer, regardless of age. Then in 1899, the juvenile justice system was born. 18 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the objectives of the juvenile system "are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment." 8 9 As a! result, " [t] he State is parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge."' 90 For the first half of the twentieth century, the juvenile justice system was kept separate and distinct from the adult criminal justice system.' 9 ' However, the execution of certain juvenile offenders as well as some incarceration ofjuveniles in adult penal facilities continued.1 9 2 Nevertheless, a child convicted in criminal court generally received a impose the Court's long catalog of requirements upon juvenile proceedings .. is to invite a long step backwards into the nineteenth century." 19 9 Even though this warning has not come to pass, the Court has grown more sensitive to the original objectives of the juvenilejustice system. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that trial by jury is not required for juvenile proceedings and thereby stated that "if the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate existence." 20 0
The Thompson holding is consistent with the trend toward more clearly defining the gray area between the juvenile justice system and the adult criminal justice system. The Court's opinion of the juvenile justice system, like the system itself, has matured over the years. It has gone from recognizing the bright promise of a new idea for juvenile justice to remedying the limitations of a system that has not always achieved its laudable purpose. Most importantly, though, the Court has not abandoned the principle that somehow children are different from adults. Thompson is a recognition that the juvenile justice system and the adult criminal justice system share many common objectives and results, and that the death penalty is not among these. There is no question that society should not excuse Thompson for his crime, but executing him eliminates all prospects for rehabilitation and affords no more protection for society than secured imprisonment. Moreover, juvenile executions speak more eloquently of society's failures than of thejuvenile's crime. In short, the Thompson holding is a positive development in juvenile and adult criminal justice.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Thompson plurality reduced eighth amendment analysis to a formula whose factors included state legislation and jury statistics in order to ascertain whether a societal consensus exists regarding the execution of juvenile offenders. In an effort to quantify its holding, the plurality misplaced its emphasis. Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, while recognizing that the numbers did not add up to a bright 199 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting); accord In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 376 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 200 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971)(Blackmun, J., plurality opinion). Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, stated that "however much the juvenile system may have failed in practice, its very existence as an ostensibly beneficent and noncriminal process for the care and guidance of young persons demonstrates the existence of the community's sympathy and concern for the young." Id. at 555 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). line rule, nevertheless vacated Thompson's death sentence in her new role as legislator. The dissent's "irrelevant" declaration concerning the plurality's disproportionality discussion illuminated its surrender to the plurality's recognition that youth deserve special treatment in eighth amendment analysis.
The Court could not have anticipated the tremendous challenge imposed by Thompson's death sentence. The Court has long maintained that the death penalty is a constitutional penalty under certain circumstances, and further that the juvenile justice system is itself worthy of merit. As the Court demonstrated, it is difficult even for reasonable minds to draw an appropriate line that effectively separates the child from the adult and the offender from the punishment. However, since society can protect itself from violent juvenile crime without resort to execution, the Court can safely guard the principle that children, though deserving as citizens of certain fundamental due process rights afforded adults, must nevertheless receive the special consideration and treatment embodied by the juvenile justice system. The Court will soon consider the validity of capital punishment statutes that permit the execution of sixteen year olds, 20 1 seventeen year olds, 20 2 and the mentally retarded. 20 3 Hopefully the Court will focus less on an examination of the nation's pulse and more on capacity, proportionality andjustice. The children of a decent society deserve an enlightened Court that confronts the tough issues and prominently addresses these issues in its opinions. As Thomas Jefferson once said:
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors. 
